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ABSTRACT
A NOVEL SPAM CAMPAIGN IN ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
By Yufeng Zhen

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science at
Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.
Major Director: Meng Yu, Ph.D.
Associate Professor, Department of Computer Science

The increasing popularity of the Online Social Networks (OSNs) has made the OSNs major
targets of spammers. They aim to illegally gather private information from users and spread spam
to them. In this paper, we propose a new spam campaign that includes following key steps: creating fake accounts, picking legitimate accounts, forming friendships, earning trust, and spreading
spam. The unique part in our spam campaign is the process of earning trust. By using social bots,
we significantly lower the cost of earning trust and make it feasible in the real world. By spreading
spam at a relatively low speed, we make the life span of our fake accounts much longer than in traditional spam campaigns. This means the trust we have earned can be used multiple times instead
of only one time in traditional spam campaigns. We evaluate our spam campaign by comparing it
with the traditional campaign, and the comparison shows that our spam campaign is less detectable
and more efficient than the traditional campaign.

Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter covers the background of my research in the area of online social networks(OSNs)
and their security-related problems.

1.1

Online social networks

Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter and Myspace offer services like communicating with other OSNs users and sharing status with others, and are reflections of people’s social
relationships in the real world. As OSNs have been growing in immense popularity and garnering
more and more attention, it is inevitable that spammers focus on them. OSNs provide a way to
keep track of our friends’ status and to communicate with them more conveniently. Furthermore,
OSNs makes it much easier to make new friends, even when they are one thousand miles away.
Take Facebook as an example. Facebook, as a social network service, was established in
2004 [1]. And in nowadays, it has been the most popular online social network in the world, with
more than 800 million users all over the world [2]. As one of the OSNs, Facebook requires people
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to register to become a user if they want to use Facebook service. And, Facebook encourage users
to fill as much information as they can into their profiles, which users can choose to share with
with public, their friends or some of them on Facebook.
Facebook users can send friend request to other Facebook users to make friends with them
who can be their friends in the real world or total strangers, and others can either deny or confirm
the request. And “make friends” here means to create a link between user and another user, which
is described as “friendship” by Facebook.
Facebook users can update information they want to share with other users, such as videos,
photos and links. And the place they post everything in is called “wall”, where users can make it
accessible to public, all their friends, some of their friends, friends of their friends or just themselves. And they can also post things on their friend’s wall.For users who have not changed the
security settings, the default setting is to share their profiles with friends and to share posts with
public, which means only friends can see their profiles and every Facebook user can gain access to
their posts.
In Facebook, users do accept friend requests from those who are strangers in real world;
some of them even send friend requests to strangers to make themselves seem popular. The big
difference makes it much more convenient for spammers to spread spam through Facebook.

1.2

Social Graph

The social graph of OSNs is the mapping of people in OSNs and what their relationships are,
which contains a graph G = (V, E). It is generated by users’ activities: creating accounts, forming
friendships with other users, sending messages to friends, and responding to the messages sent by
friends. And for every node in V , there is one attribute set Xn belonging to it. Similarly, there is
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also one attribute set Xe for every edge in E.
Take Facebook as an example, the social graph of Facebook is a undirected graph. And
every node in V represents a Facebook account, and every edge between two nodes in E represents
a link between every two accounts. Plus, the attribute set Xn contains name, email, etc. And the
attribute set Xe contains the features of the link: friendship, the value of which is taken in 0, 1, the
number of communications our nodes start, and the number of responses we get. Value 1 means
there is a friendship between two accounts, and Value 0 means not.
In social graph, creating a node means creating an account, and creating an edge means
building a friendship between different accounts.

1.3

Betweenness centrality

Betweenness centrality, according to [3], is a measure of a node’s centrality in a network equal to
the number of shortest paths from all vertices to all others that pass through that node. (bi j (pk )) is
betweenness centrality of node pk for node pair (pi , p j ), and it is defined [4] as below:

bi j (pk ) =

gi j (pk )
gi j

(1.1)

In Equation 1.1, pk represents node k in the graph, pi and p j represent two different nodes,
gi j represents all the geodesic paths between pi and p j .
And, the overall betweenness centrality of node pk , CB (pk ) is defined as the following:

n

n

CB (pk ) = ∑ ∑
i

3

j

gi j (pk )
gi j

(1.2)

In Equation 1.2, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. And, CB (pk ) ∈ [0, 1]. The ideal situation is when CB (pk ) = 1,
then we only need make friends with account pk and post on his/her wall, and all other accounts
in the same community can see it. The worst situation is when CB (pk ) = 0, then we have to make
friends with all accounts in the same community and post on everyone’s wall.

1.4

Vulnerabilities in OSNs defence mechanism

Spammers are those adversaries that try to send spam to other OSNs users. These spam they spread
are messages similar to email spam and usually contain malicious links that might lead to malware,
phishing attack or different kinds of advertisement.These spam aim to coax receivers to click those
links.
To gain as much profit as possible, spammers need a large number of audience to view their
spam. Therefore, the tremendous number in OSNs makes users the perfect targets for spammers.
To spread spam in OSNs, a spammer has to gain full access to some users in OSNs so that he
can send spam to other users. So, a spammer targeting OSNs either has already had or trying to
gain full access to some accounts. To fully access accounts in OSNs, a spammer either create fake
accounts or compromise legitimate ones. Comparing with compromising legitimate accounts, the
advantage of creating fake ones is that the spammer dose not need to worry about the possibility
that the original owners of accounts report him to the operator of OSNs. But with full access
to compromised accounts, a spammer also has partial access to those friends accounts in OSNs,
which means he can spread spam to those friends accounts and doesn’t need to endeavor to create
fake accounts, form friendships with other ones and earn their trust.
OSNs are vulnerable to spam. It is hard for OSNs to prevent spam from infiltrating, for
currently the methods used by OSNs operators, like CAPCHA, valid email address and personal
profiles, are not sufficient enough. Furthermore, there are some accounts that still survive after
4

spreading spam. Without other users reporting spamming accounts to OSNs operators or the number of spread spam reaching the threshold assigned by them, spammers can spread spam without
the concern of being detected. Existing defense strategies are based on features they recognized
from spam (like spam content, link ratio, and so on) and spamming accounts (like history, posting
patterns, and so on). This makes these strategies inflexible, and they are much less effective if
spammers change their features.

1.4.1

CAPTCHA

Although OSNs deploy CAPTCHA [5]as a measurement to prevent automatical account creation,
an attacker might be able to conquer or bypass this barrier. In [6], the attacker employ KOOBFACE to send panic-causing message including CAPTCHA test to the targeted victims, so they
might solve it for the attacker. Similarly in [7], the attacker plant CAPTCHA test into victims’
web browsing session without causing their alert, and they might solve the test with no suspicion.In [8], the proposed attack method is able to anaylze and break CAPTCHA. In [9], several attack methods are mentioned, like text recognition, audio recognition, side-channel attacks,featurebased attack, attacks against database-based CAPT-CHAs, and attacks based on implementation
and design flaws. In [10], attackers only need to pay very little money to solve CAPTC-HA test,
which is usually 0.75 dollar per 1,000 successful cracks of CAPTCHAs, for some working people
only 0.5 dollar per 1,000 ones. To save the cost needed on analyzing and implementing attack
methods for solving CAPTCHA test, we choose pay for the CAP-TCHA-solving service.

1.4.2

Personal profiles

During the registration of OSNs, the user is always requested to fill his/her personal information,
like name, date of birth and sex, which is also how the operator of OSNs prevent the creation of fake
5

accounts; And more importantly, he/she needs to provide an valid EMAIL address to OSNs, based
on which the operator of OSNs is able to detect automated registration that is usually involved in
large scale infiltration.
In OSNs, there are two ways for other users to get familiar with you: One is through the
communication; The other is by the personal profiles. To every viewer(another user), the user’s
personal profile is always the first impression. And, a good impression is always a good start to
become popular. Thus, to leave a good impression, we need to fill abundant and attractive personal
information into the profiles. We can gather pictures of good looking people from internet [8].
And we can fill real person’s name into the name field, so it will look authentic to other users.

1.4.3

Decision-making Process

In OSNs, how do operators make the decision of the removal of a spammer account? There are
some elements that have to be taken into consideration by them, such as account history, number
of friends, communication frequency and user’s influence.
The longer history an account has, the less likely it is a spammer one. And if an account
spread spam, then its’ friends might “unfriend” it. Thus, if an account has relatively more friends,
it would seem more convincing to be a legitimate one. If an account barely communicates with
any of its friends, that would make it seem suspicious. Therefore, a spammer account should talk
with friends to seem normal. And, if an account has major influence on other accounts, surely that
will make it harder for operators to decide to remove this account from the network.
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Chapter 2
Related Works
In [11], they propose a cross-domain spam detection framework by using associative classification and cross social-corpora classification. To achieve the goal of associative classification, the
authors’ classifier is based on both the object and respective associated objects. For example, both
the message object and the the associated webpage objects are taken into account during the classification. And, the cross social-corpora classification improves the performance of spam detection
for the much larger amount of data from across-domain social networks. In [12], they characterize spam campaigns using automated techniques based on the study of wall messages between
Facebook users. Based on the study, the authors find that more than 70 percent of malicious wall
messages are about luring people to go to phishing websites, and more than 97 percent of spamming accounts are compromised accounts instead of fake accounts. Besides, they find the pattern
of spammers’ time stamp, which is the early morning, when most of legitimate users are not active.
In [13], they use honey pot similar technique to collect data, analyze the collected data and then
identify anomalous behavior of users. They create fake accounts, and then collect data passively,
which means they accept all friend requests instead of sending any friend requests. By this way,
they can reduce the possibility of being reached by legitimate users. In [14] [15], they present
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frameworks of Social Honeypot Project for detecting spammers in online social networks. In [16],
based on the study of the dataset of million suspended Twitter accounts, they characterize the behavior pattern and lifetime of spamming accounts, the campaigns they execute, and the abuse of
legitimate web services. Plus, they detect an emerging marketplace of illegitimate programs operated by spammers. In [17], based on the analysis of spamming accounts in Twitter, they present
how to characterize spam and spamming accounts in Twitter. In [18], a spam detecting framework
based on user spam reports is presented. The framework is on the basis of HITS web link analysis framework and is implemented in three models that propagate among messages reported by
the same user, messages authored by the same user, and messages with similar content. In [19],
spam classifiers are developed to detect spam messages spread by collective attention spammers.
These spammers exploit users’ attention for they easily focus on a phenomenon. In [20], based
on the analysis of inner social relationships between criminal accounts and outer social relationships between criminal accounts and their legitimate social friends, a criminal account inference
algorithm is presented on Twitter. In [21], a detailed analysis of links, which are acquired by suspended spammer accounts on Twitter, leads to findings that link farming is widely used and most
of the farmed links come from a small fraction of Twitter users. In [22], they introduce a realtime
immune system that checks and classifies all read and write actions in real time.
In [23], a tutorial and survey on effective fake accounts defenses in online social networks
is given. In [24] and [25], they introduce how to identify fake account activities in online social
networks. In [24], the authors propose a classification system based on the observation of the
difference among human, bot and cyborg in terms of tweeting behavior, tweet content, and account
properties.In [25], the authors, based on the study these Sybil accounts on Renren social network,
analyze their link creation behavior.
Additionally, in [26], the author finished the creation of fake accounts by using social bots.
And this is of great help on my spam campaign.
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Chapter 3
Campaign Model
This chapter discusses our approach of our spam campaign. This includes creating spammer accounts , building friendships, earning trust and spreading spam.

3.1

Overview of our approach

Among all the OSNs, we take Facebook as an example to explain our spam campaign. As is shown
in Figure 3.1, there are four sequence steps in our spam campaign: spammer accounts creation,
building relationships, earning trust, and spreading spam. And to make it much less possible
that the spammer accounts are detected by Facebook operators and spread more spam with more
clickthrough, we have to follow these steps to finish our spam campaign.
In spammer accounts creation, with the help of socialbots and botmasters, we make large
number of fake accounts automatically, through which we spread spam. As the result, we make a
huge amount of fake nodes, which belong to set W .
In building relationships, we first form friendships among our fake nodes, which forms edges
9

Attack_initiated
Create fake accounts
Fake_accounts_available
Pick legit accounts
Legit_accounts_chosen
Lose friendships Build friendships
Friendships_formed
Earn trust

Lose fake accounts
Lose friendships

Trust_obtained
Spread spam
Spam_sent

Figure 3.1: State transition graph of the new spam campaign
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between our nodes. And the edges are contained in a set F, which, along with set W together,
consists a subgraph H = (W, F).
After our subgraph is built, we start building links with legitimate nodes out there in the
social graph. And in this way, we add our subgraph into the social graph. And, during this, the
links we build between our subgraph and the social graph are the pathes our spam is going to be
spread through.
After emerging our subgraph into the social graph, we start the essential step of our campaign, i.e trying to win friends’ trust. To achieve this goal, a conversation is initiated with each
friend. And a measure of trust, which is the our posts to response ratio, is taken.
Finally, having friends’ trust, here comes the final step: spreading spam. The spammer
accounts can either directly spread spam(a link for example), or put the spam on the web site and
tell friends it is a piece of recently updated deal news, and they would probably go to the web
site and click the link. To avoid the operator’s attention, we use those large number of spammer
accounts we created and make every account spread relatively fewer spams [25].
Furthermore, during the step of building friendships, it is possible that we reach more legitimate accounts for an account can see its friends’ friends. Thus, we need redo this step until we
have enough friends, or we reach an account that has already been the friend of one of our fake
accounts.
Moreover, if we lose friends after spreading spam for some time, we go back to the step of
building friendships; and if we lose accounts during spreading spam, we go back to the step of
creating spammer accounts.
Continuous-Time Markov Chains(CTMC) [27] is used to describe our spam campaign.
CTMC is used to explain a stochastic process with discrete state space. And, in this stochastic process, the present state only depends on the previous state. The matrix in Equation 3.1 is
11

called infinitesimal generator matrix, which is used to describe CTMC. In Equation 3.1, ri j (0 ≤
i ≤ 5, 0 ≤ j ≤ 5, i 6= j) represents the rate of the transition from current state i to a different state
j, rii = − ∑i6= j ri j . If there is a state transition between state i and a different state j, then ri j has a
positive value; Otherwise, the value of ri j is zero. rii is always negative.
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(3.1)

Chapter 4
Implementation of our spam campaign
In this chapter, I introduce our spam campaign and explain the vulnerability of OSNs. Afterward,
I compare the impacts of the RSF intrusion on sensor reputations through various simulations.

4.1

Spammer Accounts Creation

In the whole attack, we create 105 fake accounts, for in [26] about 100 fake accounts have been
successfully created. And we form 133 friendships for each of our account, for 130 is the average
number of friends in Facebook; and, for the purpose of avoiding that patterns of friends number
are recognized by Facebook operators, we will change the number to a random one around 130 for
each of our accounts in real attack.
To increase the number of spread spam(NN ), we need as many fake accounts as we can
obtain. Thus, we create a large number of fake accounts belonging to the same community which
is a real one or at least looks a real one. And every a few of them build friendships between each
other, so we can increase every node’s degrees. By this way, every node’s degree will be greater
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than zero, thus, they will seem normal and have higher acceptance rate of friendship requests.
To create an account, we need to provide a valid email address, personal information, besides
solving the captcha. And since we need a huge amount of accounts, it would be too much cost if
we create them manually. And the social bot would be a excellent choice, for with the help of
social bot, we can create accounts automatically.
During the creation, real name should be put in the name field. In [26], the author put photos of good-looking persons collected from internet into fake accounts to increase attractiveness.
Besides that, in the profile, we should add abundant information. For example, if we try to spread
spam containing football advertisement, then we should fill football related information in the
profile, like “I like football.”, or “I am a huge fan of NEW YORK GIANTS.”
To avoid patterns, we make ten versions of profiles and put there profiles into our accounts.
And, we make sure that accounts with same profiles do not make friends with each other or send
friend request to the same stranger account. Plus, randomization should be used to make sure that
no pattern would exist.
Each one of the accounts we create means adding a new node v into V . With more nodes
added into G, we are able to reach more other nodes which represent legitimate users in Facebook.
And, before we try to send friendship requests, we form some edges among our nodes, so we build
a subgraph H = (W, F).
Socialbot: As mentioned in [26], we need socialbots for accounts we want to create. And as
for each socialbot, we need two functions from it. The first one is being capable to communicate
with other accounts, which means it is going to be used to read and write, like words and pictures.
The second one is that it need be able to form edges in social graph to fit in, i.e. we need it to send
friend requests to legitimate accounts and to accept the friend requests from legitimate accounts, if
there are any.
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Further more, we also define commands, which are to make our account’s actions seem like
initiated by real a human being instead of a socialbot.
Botmaster: Since we need a large number of accounts, the number of socialbots we need is
going to be large,too. Thus, with no doubt, at least one botmaster [26] is needed to control all the
socialbots. Plus, for we need different versions of profiles and words(posts) in the conversations
with friends accounts, multiple botmasters are needed in our situation, and each of them are in
charge of their own accounts.
A botmaster contains three main components: a botworker, a botupdater, and an engine. The
botworker creates and maintains socialbots that are under its control. The botupdater keeps socialbots updated with new commands issued by the botmaster. The engine keeps all the commands
issued by the botmaster and runs a controller being responsible of sending commands to socialbots
when needed.
To reduce the cost of management, some commands are kept in socialbots, while the others
are kept in botmaster and are sent to socialbot when needed.
As for the personal profiles needed to fill during the creation, it is going to be better for the
safety of our accounts if we make different versions of profiles for every one of them. However, it
is not feasible if we consider the cost of creating such large a number of different profiles. Thus,
considering the trade-off, we make a compromise which is that we make 10 different versions of
profiles for every 10 accounts we create.

4.2

Building Friendships

By forming friendships,the goal is to continue to increase nodes degree, so we can keep those
accounts living longer. To achieve this goal and to raise acceptance rate, we try to find those users
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Figure 4.1: Attack Structure of the New Spam Campaign
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who want to make friends with any other user no matter if he/she is an acquaintance in real world,
or who share the same interest with us. As showed in Figure 4.2, we send friend requests from our
fake community to targeted community.
To find who share the same interest with us, we can use method used in [28]. In this paper,
using passive de-anonymization method. Authors can breach a large number of users’ privacy
without the need of being their friends. And, with these private information, we can know what is
their profiles, like interest. And this would tell us whom to send friend requests to with the expect
of raising acceptance rate.
Besides, we calculate betweenness centrality value of all the nodes in the targeted community.
It would be better if those users have one of these two features: (1) They have a lot of friends,
but they only talk to a few of them; (2) They do not have a large number of friends, but they keep
sending friend requests. Because these users will more likely accept our friend requests.
Besides that, the spammer accounts also try to make friends with those having the same
interest as in written in the profile of spammer accounts.
In Facebook, operators can scan all users and form a social relationship graph, in which
those accounts with few and too many friends will stand out. Thus, to make sure our accounts will
not stand out in the social relationship graph, we have to try to increase nodes degrees to near the
average level of 130. Plus, with more friends, it will be more likely for our friend requests to be
accepted.
By the this step, we add the subgraph H into the social graph G. And H is consisted of the
accounts that belong to the same community. And adding a subgraph into the social graph has
more influence on the social graph than adding individual nodes. That is because with the help a
subgraph of large amount of nodes,some of which are connected between each other, we can reach
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much more legitimate nodes. Plus, our nodes seem more legitimate within a community, which
will help extend every one’s life span.
Every friendship request is a try of building a new edge, and every friendship we form
represents another edge added into E. And deg(v) is used to denote the number of edges incident
with it. Adding deg(v) to the average level will make it much more possible that our spammer
accounts nodes do not stand out in the social graph.
We do not intend to let any two of our accounts share a common friend for two reasons.
Firstly, it is a waste of increasing cost for two spammer accounts to send spam to the same legitimate account. Secondly, we only have certain number of different versions of profiles, so if a
legitimate account is friend of two or more of our accounts, then it is very possible that he/she will
find out our accounts are fake.
Plus, as showed in Figure 4.1: We first send an command from the botmaster to the socialbot;
And secondly the socialbot initiates the correspondent operation, i.e. it controls its account to carry
out the action requested by the operation. And, it always involves our fake account and its friend(s).
Thus, it is absolutely necessary to determine which legitimate accounts we aim to form
friendships with before we actually start building friendships. After the decision of targeted legitimate accounts is made , the botmaster sends a command named f riendupdate to all of its
socialbots, as shown in Figure 4.1. And it is defined as below: After receiving the command
f riendupdate and the set At full of targeted accounts along with it, the socialbot executes the
operation f request(s, o) to all of its targeted accounts, where s is the socialbot that executes the
operation, o is the targeted account. After the executtoin of operation f request(s, o), the socialbot
waits for the returned value r f r from every targeted account. And if the targeted this user confirms
the friend request, then the returned value r f r should be 1; Otherwise, the returned value r f r should
be 0.
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And, if r f r = 1, push r f r into Xe , which means, in the social graph G, a new edge is formed.
At the same time, deg(v), which is initiated as 0, increases by 1.

4.3

Earning Trust

In traditional method, the spammer exploits the trust owned by the legitimate accounts they have
hijacked instead of earning it using fake accounts. And there are two reasons for this: Firstly,
in traditional method, the spammer needs to log in each of his/her hijacked accounts and send
messages to all the friends to earn trust. And the cost of this process is unacceptable. Secondly,
traditionally the spammer spreads spam in very short time, so to achieve the goal of spreading
as many spam as possible, he/she has to keep the spreading speed high, which will cause the
operators’ attention and make the life span of their accounts short. And, this means the trust can
only be used once during the spam spreading process.
In our method, the way we control the accounts and spread spam causes a much lower cost
of earning trust and a much longer life span of our fake accounts, which makes it possible and
useful to earn trust before trying to spread spam.
In our method, firstly, the spammer sets up a web site containing some good deal news (link)
about what his friends are interested in. Secondly, he keeps updating fresh deal news and tells his
friends about it, so that they will go to the web site to look at the updates. Thirdly, our accounts
communicate with other legitimate accounts. For example, we share news about recent football
game, and we also can make comments on it.
Using this method, spammer accounts can earn other users’ trust without the need of posting
lots of links, which might get operators’ attention.
Let fuv be the friendship value, and ns be the number of communications our nodes start, and
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20

nr be the number of responses we get. We use Vtn which is calculated based on ns and nr , which
will be mentioned in section 4.6.
When we try to earn friends’ trust, that means we try to increase ns and nr between nodes u
and v, if fuv = 1. And, in here, u is one of our nodes who starts the conversation and v is the node
that represents the user whose trust we are fighting for.
To communicate with friends accounts, we use a command named postupdate defined as
below: when we decide to make a post, each socialbot bi ∈ B, which received the post update
command from its botmater, create a message either crawled from the internet according to our
requirements(for example, we require it must be from one specific web, or it must be about a NFL
game finished recently, even or it must be about one specific NFL team, etc) or provided directly
by us along with that command. And as required by the command, the socialbot will initiate the
execution of operation write(s, o, c) to all the friends accounts, where s is the socialbot executes the
operation, o is the targeted friend account, and c is the content of message. ns , which is initiated of
the value 0, increases by 1 after every execution of operation write(s, o, c).
After sending a message to a friend account, we will expect the response from him/her. So
the botmaster send a command named detect to each of its socialbots. And the command detect is
defined as below: every some time, the socialbot executes an operation check(s, o) on its account
to see if there has been a response from any of its friends accounts, where s is the friend account
from which that response is, o is the socialbot that has been keeping detecting the response. If
there is a response, operation check(s, o) will return a signal value 1.
And if a response is detected by the socialbot, it will receive a command named obtainupdate
that is automatically sent by itself, which is defined as below: The socialbot bi execute the operation read(s, o, c), where s is the friend account from which that response is, o is the socialbot that
has been keeping detecting the response, and c is the content of message.Furthermore, nr , which
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is initiated of the value 0, increases by 1 after every execution of operation read(s, o, c).

4.4

Spreading Spam

Having friends’ trust, the spammer accounts can put the spam(a link for example) on the web site
and tell friends it is a piece of recently updated deal news, and they would probably go to the web
site and click the link.
It will avoid the operator’s attention that we create a large number of spammer accounts
and making every account spread relatively fewer spams. It is because the operator always mainly
focuses on accounts that spread much more spams.
Let n be a nonnegative integer. A path of length n from u to v in G is a sequence of n edges
of G. When one of our accounts spreads spam to a friend, all friends of him/her can see it. So, it
means the spam from our nodes can reach any nodes as long as n ≤ 2. And, it also means when we
target a community, instead of spreading spam to all the members, we only need to spread spam to
some of them and all of them can see the spam.
After finishing earning trust, we need to do a calculation, and it is defined as following: For
each group of friends in one community ci , the socialbot initiates one null set Sci and a temporary
set filled with all the member nodes of the community, and then calculate the betweenness centrality value CB (pk ) of all accounts in community ci , where pk is each node in the community ci . After
all the calculations are completed, it moves the account with highest betweenness centrality value
CB (pk ) in the same community ci into the set Sci and remove all its friends from the temporary set.
And, it moves the next available node with highest betweenness centrality value CB (pk+1 ) into the
set Sci and remove all its friends. It keeps doing this until there are no more nodes in the temporary
set. When the execution of command calculate is finished, the socialbot is required to return a
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signal of completing the calculation to botmaster.
After receiving the returning signal, the botmaster sends a command named spam to the
socialbot. The command spam is similar to command post update and is defined as below:
when we decide to spread spam, each socialbot bi ∈ B, which received the command spam
from its botmater, create a message provided directly by us along with that command. And as
required by the command, the socialbot will initiate the execution of operation write(s, o, c) to
all the friends accounts, where s is the socialbot executes the operation, o is the targeted friend
account, and c is the content of the spam message.
As for command post update, each botmaster sends its own version with unique message
content to its socialbots. And different from command post update, command spam is exactly the
same for all botmasters. That means all socialbots spread the same spam, and this is because the
whole spam campaign aims at making as many clickthrough on the spam as possible. And it will
lower the clickthrough on each kind of spam if each botmaster sends command spam with different
kinds of spam message.

4.5

Our campaign against existing spam detection technologies

In [13], six features are used to detect spammer accounts: FF ratio(R), URL ratio(U), Message
similarity(S), Friend choice(F), Message Sent(M) and Friend Number(FN).
FF ratio(R): This feature is the acceptance rate of the friend request. In our method, unlike in
the traditional method, we make friends with some of our own accounts first. And, in the first part,
the acceptance rate R1 = 1. After this, we continue to build friendships as in traditional method, in
this part, the acceptance rate R2 remains as the same as in traditional method.
Let us assume: In the first part, the number of friend requests is n f ; Similarly, in second part,
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the number of friend requests is nl . Thus, the total acceptance rate in our method Rnew is defined
as below:

Rnew =

n f R1 + nl R2
n f + nl

(4.1)

n f + nl R2
n f + nl

(4.2)

In Equation 4.1, R1 = 1, thus:

Rnew =

In traditional method, the acceptance rate Rold is defined as below:

Rold = R2

(4.3)

And, obviously Rnew > Rold . Thus, our method does not have this feature.
URL ratio(U): As in [13], it is defined as below:

U=

messagescontainingurls
totalmessages

(4.4)

In traditional method, most or even all of the messages contain urls, so the URL ratio in traditional method(Uold ) is very close to 1 or equal to 1. But, in our method, for we use conversations
to fight for trust, and we do not put any url in the messages in this period, Unew in our method is
much lower.
Message similarity(S): Similarly, for we use conversations to fight for trust, and we do not
send any similar messages to one friend. Thus, Snew in our method is much lower.
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Friend choice(F): This feature is to find out a spammer account that uses a name list to pick
friend accounts. Since we do not look for friends this way, we do not need to worry about this
feature at all.
Message Sent(M): This feature is to find those spammer accounts that only send a small
number of messages. And again, since we need send lots of messages in our earn-trust period, the
Mnew in our method is much higher that Mold in traditional method.
Friend Number(FN): This feature is that a spammer account has a small number of friends.
For we make our friends number FNnew to the average level, we do not need to worry about this
feature.
In [29], there are 6 six features: Sender social degree, Interaction history, Cluster size, Average time interval, Average URL number per message and Unique URL number.
Sender social degree: The authors in [29] think that the majority of spammer accounts are
compromised accounts, so the sender social degree is much higher. For we make our friends
numberFNnew to the average level, we do not need to worry about this feature.
Interaction history: The authors think a spammer account only communicate with a small
part of its friends. Since we send messages to all of our friends accounts while we are trying to
earn their trust, we do not need worry about this feature.
Cluster size: This feature is that in every spam campaign the messages sent are similar. But,
since we send different messages to our friends while we are trying to earn their trust, we do not
need to worry about this feature.
Average time interval: The author thinks that a spammer account spread large number of
spam in a very short time. But, since we spread spam after earning trust and we only spread spread
a relatively small number of spam every day, we do not need to worry about this feature, either.
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Average URL number per message: For the same reason mentioned above, we do not need
to worry about this feature, either.
Unique URL number: This feature is based on an assumption that our spam are all blacklissted, but in fact, most of the spam are not in blacklist. Also, since we do not use ”embed” to
diversify our link into different urls, we do not need to worry about this feature, either.

4.6

Evaluation

In this section, the click rate and number of spread spam are used to compare different spam
campaigns.
To measure the click rate, we need to measure how much trust we have earned first. Thus,
we use the method based on the frequency friends respond our posts. The more frequently they
respond to our posts, the higher the trust value(Vtn ) is. Similarly, we consider the trust value in
traditional method as Vtt . And Vtn is defined as below:

Vtn =

nr
ns

(4.5)

In Equation (4.5), nr denotes number of friends’ responses, ns denotes number of our posts, and
Vtn ∈ [0, 1].
With Vtn , we can estimate the click rate. We consider using Pcn to denote the click rate for
our new method, and Pct for traditional one. The average waiting time(τ) of spam being clicked is
defined as below[30]:
τ(Vtn ) =

1
(Vtn )γ

(4.6)

In Equation (4.6), τ is calculated based on trust(Vtn ). γ is a parameter [30] that allow us to
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interpolate between that random choice limit and the deterministic case. When γ = 0, Vtn does
not have any influence on τ, which means the event of spam being clicked happens completely
randomly; When γ = 1, τ is strictly based on Vtn , which means the spam sent to an account who
has higher trust(Vtn ) on us is clicked earlier before those with lower Vtn .
And, based on Equation (4.6), we can define Pcn as below:

Pcn =

n( τ ≤ (7 − tsent ))
ntotal

(4.7)

In Equation (4.7), tsent is the day when a message is sent, 7 is that time period of our spreading
spam process, n( τ ≤ (7 − tsent )) is the number of messages that received response from friends
before our spreading spam process is over, and ntotal is the total number of spam sent during our
spreading spam process. In Equation (4.7), we assume that a recipient account checks our spam
the same day or the next day of the day of spam being sent. And, although it is possible that the
recipient accounts that did not click the spam will click them after our spreading spam process, the
possibility is too low to consider.
For spammers in traditional method do not try to earn friends’ trust, naturally, the trust value
in traditional method Vtt is 0. Therefore, we can not measure Vtt . But, Pct is definitely lower than
Pcn , for spammers in traditional method do not have friends’ trust.
For the traditional spam campaign, we consider number of accou-nts(Nat ), frequency of
spreading spam per day(Ft ), expected life span(Lt ) and number of spam each account spread per
time(nt ). Similarly, we consider Nan , Fn , Ln and nn for our new spam campaign.
Thus, the total number of spread spam for traditional spam campaign (NT ) is defined as
below:
Nat

NT = ∑ nt Ft Li
i=1
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(4.8)

In Equation (4.8), Li ≤ Lt . And we consider Ft equals 1. This is because that it is mentioned [12]
that most spammer accounts spread spam when most legitimate accounts are inactive. And there
is only one time interval satisfying this requirement in one day, which is when people are asleep.
So I choose to spread spam one time when most legitimate users are asleep and away from their
accounts. We also consider Lt equals 4, which is because the fact mentioned in [13], which is that,
on Facebook, the average lifespan of a spammer account is four days. And, we need to change Lt
to a different value if we use it on another OSN.
And, to calculate the total number of direct spam, we need to consider stage 4 as a fiduciary
object, for when we are in stage 4, it means we are going to spread spam until all friends of our
every fake account are sent a spam. As about the stage 4 in our spam campaign, there are only two
possibilities: we fall into stage 4 or we do not. The possibility of us being in stage 4 is P4 , and the
other possibility for not being in stage 4 is (1 − P4 ). And, when we are in stage 4, the number of
directly spread spam is Fn Nan T ; In the other hand, the number is 0. And, according to the definition
of expectation in probability, the expected value of total number of spread spam(direct spam) for
our new spam campaign (NN ) is calculated by defined as below:

NN = E[X] = (Fn Nan T )P4 + 0(1 − P4 ) = Fn Nan T P4

(4.9)

The number of spread spam is consisted of number of directly spread spam and number of
indirectly spread spam. And, the number of directly spread spam is named as number o f direct
spam , which stands for the number of spam that directly sent to the targeted legitimate accounts.
Similarly, the number of indirectly spread spam is called number o f indirect spam. And in this
case, when we send a spam to a friend of ours, our friend’s friends are also able to see this spam,
and the number of clicks caused by this is called number o f indirect spam.
Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12 are about the change of direct
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Figure 4.3: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate of creating accounts
spam number with the change of one or two rates. In these figures, the default values are: rate
o f creating accounts = 15, rate o f f orming f riendships = 1995, rate o f earning trust = 1050,
rate o f spreading spam = 805. And, all these rates change by step of 1. For the convenience of
discussion, we assume these values are the threshold values, and any values equal to or above them
will draw the operators’ attention in a probability. And, the vertical axis number o f direct spam
means the change of it according to the change of one or more rate values.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the changing range of rate creating accounts, which is a in Figure 3.1, is from 1 to 105, which is because when a is below 1, it does not make any sense in our
attack and we only plan to create 105 fake accounts. There is a threshold about rate a. And, when
rate a is lower than or equal to the threshold value, there is no back loop in the attack procedure
which means the states go from state 0 to state 5 step by step without going back. We assume the
threshold is 15. When rate a is less than 15, the number o f direct spam stays at 5635, for both rate
d and the period of spreading spam do not change. Otherwise, the number changes with rate a, for
there is a probability that some of accounts are removed or some of friendships are canceled, and
then we need go back to form more friendships or create more accounts. And the probability value
goes higher with the increase of rate a. So, when rate a is equal to or larger than 15, the higher it
becomes, the smaller number o f direct spam is.
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Figure 4.4: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate of forming friendships
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Figure 4.5: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate earning trust
In Figure 4.4, the changing range of rate f orming f riend − ships, which is b in Figure 3.1, b
is from 1 to 13965. And, similarly, when rate b is less than 1995, there is no back loop in the attack
procedure, and then the number o f direct spam stays at 5635. Otherwise, the number decreases
with the increase of rate b. Because we need as many as friend accounts to send spam to, and too
small or too large number of friends will make our fake accounts stand out in the social graph, we
only show the situation that we try to reach around the average number of friends.
In Figure 4.5, the changing range of rate earning trust, which is c in Figure 3.1, c is from 1 to
13965. And, similarly, when rate c is less than 1050, there is no back loop in the attack procedure,
and then the number o f direct spam stays at 5635. Otherwise, the number changes with rate c.
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Figure 4.6: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate spreading spam
And, since c is the rate of earning trust, and in this step, we make normal conversations with friends,
even when rate c becomes higher than the threshold, we still can earn trust. And, spread spam is
the only next step, so the number o f direct spam goes higher after c passes the threshold. But,
when rate c becomes higher than the threshold, which means the frequency of our conversations
is higher than normal accounts do, there will be a probability that some of accounts are removed
or some of friendships are canceled, and then we need go back to form more friendships or create
more accounts. And the probability value goes higher with the increase of rate c. Thus, the number
o f direct spam after c reaches threshold is lower than before.
In Figure 4.6, the changing range of rate spreading spam, which is d in Equation 3.1, d is
from 1 to 13965. For similar reasons, number o f direct spam grows faster When rate d is less
than threshold 805 than after that. If there is no scan from Facebook operators, the increasing
speed of number o f direct spam stays the same as rate d becomes higher. Unfortunately, for the
fact of existence of scans, the higher rate d becomes, the more likely our accounts are detected,
which means the probability of being detected goes higher with the increase of rate d. That is why
number o f direct spam grows slower after rate d passes threshold.
In Figure 4.7, when rate a and b are both lower than their own thresholds, the number
o f direct spam stays the same; when a is higher than its own threshold and b is lower than its
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Figure 4.7: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate of creating accounts(a) and
forming friendships(b)
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Figure 4.8: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate of creating accounts(a) and
earning trust(c)
own threshold, the number o f direct spam increase fast; otherwise, the number o f direct spam
decreases.
In Figure 4.8, when rate a and c are both lower than their own thresholds, the number o f
direct spam stays the same; when a is higher than its own threshold and c is lower than its own
threshold, the number o f direct spam increase faster; otherwise, the number o f direct spam
increases lower.
In Figure 4.9, when rate a and d are both lower than their own thresholds, the number o f
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Figure 4.9: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate of creating accounts(a) and
spreading spam(d)
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Figure 4.10: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate forming friendships(b) and
earning trust(c)
direct spam increase faster; otherwise, the number o f direct spam increase relatively lower. But,
when d is higher than its own threshold and a is lower than its own threshold, the number o f direct
spam increase lower, and it increases faster with higher a.
In Figure 4.10, when rate b and c are both lower than their own thresholds, the number
o f direct spam stays the same; when c is higher than its own threshold and b is lower than its
own threshold, the number o f direct spam increase faster; otherwise, the number o f direct spam
increases lower.
In Figure 4.11, when rate b and d are both lower than their own thresholds, the number o f
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Figure 4.11: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate forming friendships(b) and
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Figure 4.12: Expected number of direct spam with the change of rate earning trust(c) and spreading
spam(d)
direct spam increases faster; otherwise, the number o f direct spam increases lower. But, when b
is higher than its own threshold and d is lower than its own threshold, the number o f direct spam
increase relatively faster than they are both higher than their own thresholds.
In Figure 4.12, when rate c and d are both lower than their own thresholds, the number o f
direct spam increases slowest; when only one of c and d is higher than its own threshold, the
number o f direct spam increase relatively faster; otherwise, the number o f direct spam increases
fastest.
In Figure 4.13 and 4.14, the comparison between our new spam campaign and traditional
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Figure 4.13: Comparison between our new spam campaign and traditional method by repeating
whole attack
method is shown. The assumptions of the comparison are in every attack the spam is sent to one
account one time, we have the same number of spammer accounts and friends as the traditional
method. And the life span of traditional method is three days.
In Figure 4.13, all the attack processes are repeated, and our new campaign exceeds the
traditional method during the third repetition. For social network is dynamic instead of keeping
static, full repetition of our attack is more consistent with a legitimate user’s profile. But, the
spreading speed is slower by this full repetition.
But, in Figure 4.14, only last half of the attack processes are repeated, which means we will
use the same fake accounts and send spam to the same legitimate accounts. And our new campaign
exceeds the traditional method during the second repetition. With higher risk in this repetition, the
spreading speed is faster.
And, about the indirect spam, since we choose friends based on the calculation of betweenness centrality value and we choose the ones with higher value, the probability of targeted accounts’ friends’ clicking on the spam is much higher than that of the traditional method. The
action of click is human response and it happens with a time interval, so it is a discretized event.
And there must be a distribution that is fit for this, and it will be in the higher part of the distribution
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Figure 4.14: Comparison between our new spam campaign and traditional method by repeating
last half attack
for our choosing strategy.
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Chapter 5
Proposed Defence
Because our spam campaign does not show the same features as traditional one, we need to consider new defence strategy. To simplify the discussion, we assume that there are two reasons for
the removal of an spammer account: (1) Facebook users report it to the operators of Facebook;
(2) number of spam spread by one account is above the threshold assigned by Facebook immune
system.
About the first reason, we think when operators scan their social network, they focus on
each account instead of trying to group those accounts that spread the same spam. That is why
operators make decisions partially depending on user reports. About the second reason, we think
the threshold exists because there are some accounts in Facebook that still survive after spreading
spam. In our opinion, their survival is for the number of spam they have spread is below the
threshold value and did not stand out during the operators’ scan.
With these assumptions, we consider the following defense strategies: (1) group the spammer accounts that are spreading the same spam; (2) group the spammer accounts in the same area.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In my thesis, a new spam campaign is presented, which is much more ”quite” than the traditional
method. That is because the activity pattern of our new spam campaign is more similar to that of the
legitimate users. By analyzing the traditional method, we find its shortcomings. And, by changing
the activity patterns, we make new spam campaign much less detectable without losing the goal of
spreading spam and coax people to click them: By creating fake accounts instead of compromising
legitimate accounts, we avoid that other users report about it: By choosing friends before sending
friend requests, we raise acceptance rate of the friend requests and increase the number of indirect
spam; By earning trust, we raise the click rate of our spam; By spreading spam in a lower speed, we
extend the lifespan of our fake accounts, so we do not need to frequently recreate them. Although
we do not conduct a real experiment to prove the feasibility and efficiency of our campaign, the
result of the simulation still can prove the value of our campaign.
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